The tax incidence of different price-point instant lottery games is examined. Theoretical reasons exist for expecting higher-priced instant lottery games to be less regressive than lower-priced instant games. Using game-level data from a sample of states, the empirical results show that higher-priced instant games are significantly less regressive than lower-priced games. For some games, regressivity is rejected in favor of proportionality. In addition, the tax incidence of individual instant games is quite different than that for all instant games combined. This suggests that large differences in individual instant-game tax incidence are masked if aggregated sales data are used.
Introduction
Beginning with New Hampshire's introduction of the first modern-day state lottery in 1964, forty-three states and the District of Columbia now operate state-owned lotteries. Average annual growth in lottery sales topped 5 percent in the 2000s and surpassed 10 percent during the 1980s and the 1990s. Lottery sales in the United States totaled $58 billion in fiscal year 2010, of which state governments retained (after prize payouts and administrative expenses) nearly $18 billion (roughly 2 percent of total state tax revenue) for spending on education, infrastructure, and various social programs.
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The growth of the lottery industry has sparked much academic research on various aspects of the industry.
The growth of the lottery industry over the past several decades is not only a result of more states offering lotteries, but also ever-evolving and expanding product lines designed to attract and retain customers through higher jackpots. 2 The issue garnering the most attention is the expenditure on lottery tickets by different income groups (see, e.g., Cook 1987, 1989; Scott and Garen, 1994; Farrell et al., 1999; Price and Novak, 1999; Forrest et al., 2000; Garrett and Coughlin, 2009 Because states retain a portion of all lottery sales (often termed the "lottery tax"), the www.naslp.org). The numbers for 2010 suggest an average tax rate of 31 percent. The average tax rate for lotteries has historically been much higher than that of other state excise taxes (Clotfelter and Cook, 1987) . Whether a lottery ticket constitutes a tax is a point of debate since lottery participation is strictly voluntary. 2 Filer et al. (1988) , Davis et al. (1992) , and Alm et al. (1993) explore the determinants of a state's decision to adopt a lottery. The optimal design of lottery games in terms of maximizing sales is studied by Quiggin (1991) , Cook and Clotfelter (1993) , and Garrett and Sobel (1999) . Whether lottery ticket purchases are substitutes or complements for other consumer goods is explored by Borg et al. (1993) and Kearney (2005) . The revenue impact of cross-border lottery shopping is studied by Garrett and Marsh (2002) and Tosun and Skidmore (2004) . Similarly, Brown and Rork (2005) examine the strategic interaction between state lotteries using a model of tax competition. Several studies explore whether earmarked lottery revenues increase spending on targeted programs (Borg and Mason, 1990; Spindler, 1995; Novarro, 2005) . Finally, Guryan and Kearney (2008) examine whether lottery sales increase in stores that have recently sold a large-jackpot lottery ticket. 3 This is only a small listing of the dozens of studies on the subject.
issue is commonly framed in terms of the tax incidence of state lotteries. This definition of tax incidence differs from the one typically used in public finance where tax incidence (e.g., with respect to sales taxes or excise taxes) is usually defined relative to prices (consumer and producer) and reflects some degree of welfare loss as a result of the tax. In the lottery literature, however, tax incidence makes no reference to welfare gains or losses from purchasing lottery tickets. Instead, the tax incidence of lotteries simply refers to which income group carries a greater burden of the lottery tax as a result of spending a greater percentage of their income on lottery tickets.
Determining the tax incidence of state lotteries is traditionally done by empirically estimating the income elasticity of demand for lottery tickets. The majority of research has shown that state lotteries have an income elasticity of demand less than one, thus defining state lotteries as a regressive form of taxation. Research has also shown that instant lottery games (also called "scratch-offs") tend to be more regressive than online lottery games such as Lotto or Powerball (Mikesell, 1989; Oster, 2004; Ghent and Grant, 2010) , and that online games may be a progressive form of taxation.
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Speculative reasons for the difference in the tax incidence for instant and online games stem from research on why people play lotteries and the fact that online games tend to have higher jackpots than instant games. Caplin and Leahy (1998) suggest people play the lottery for fun, and that the level of fun is dependent on the size of the jackpot relative to a player's current wealth. Thus, wealthier individuals are more likely to play online games. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that players have a poor understanding of the odds of winning. If true, 4 Instant lottery games require a player to scratch a latex covering on the ticket to immediately find out if a prize is won. Online lottery games require the player to select various combinations of numbers (say, 5 out of 49), or allow the lottery computer to select random numbers, at an authorized lottery retailer (gas station, convenience store, etc.). Drawings for online games are held several times a week and are aired on television, and the player wins if some or all of his or her numbers match those drawn. then individuals with more income (and thus with more education) have a better understanding of the expected return of lottery games and will play online games with larger jackpots, as increasing jackpots due to rollovers raise the expected return to the player.
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Although the evidence suggests that instant lottery games are more regressive than online lottery games, studies on instant lottery-game tax incidence have treated all instant lottery games within a state as identical. Before the the mid-1990s, all instant lottery games in a state (and across states as well) were very similar as they all cost $1 and had similar jackpot sizes. Since then, however, states have offered higher-priced instant lottery games in additional to the traditional $1 instant lottery game. It is now commonplace for states to simultaneously offer for sale $2, $5, $10, $20 and even $30 or $50 instant lottery tickets that have jackpots of several million dollars. These ticket prices are often referred to as price points by the lottery industry since the price for each instant game does not change. Although the jackpots available with instant games are lower than those offered in most online games, the potential jackpots available with higher-priced instant lottery games are significantly greater than the jackpots available with $1 instant lottery games.
Given that jackpot size is a reason cited for the different tax incidence of instant games and online games, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the tax incidence for instant games varies by price point since the instant-game jackpot size is positively correlated with the ticket price.
Thus, higher-priced instant lottery games should be less regressive than lower-priced instant lottery games, just as online games are less regressive than instant games. The difference in regressivity between lower-priced and higher-priced instant lottery games may also be compounded by the large price differences in instant lottery tickets, as higher-priced instant games are more likely to attract wealthier players. 5 A rollover occurs when jackpots accumulate over several drawings because each previous drawing had no winner.
This paper provides estimates of the tax incidence of instant lottery games by price point, with the purpose of testing the hypothesis that the tax incidences of all instant lottery games are not the same -specifically, that higher-priced instant games are less regressive than lower-priced instant games. The analysis is conducted using county-level data on instant-lottery game sales by price point for several U.S. states.
Understanding the tax incidence of different instant lottery games is important for several reasons. First, the tax incidence of state lotteries has been the predominant area of academic research on the lottery industry for the past several decades, but no research to date has examined the tax incidence of different instant lottery games. Second, online ticket sales have historically been a greater percentage of total lottery ticket sales (e.g., 71 percent in 1992), but in recent years instant ticket sales have represented the majority of lottery tickets sold (51 percent in 2008).
6
The paper proceeds in several steps. The next section provides an overview of instant lottery games by price point in the United States. The section also discusses the rationale for why state lotteries offer higher price-point lottery tickets and why these higher-priced instant tickets may be less regressive than lower-priced tickets. The third section of the paper discusses The growth in instant ticket sales relative to online sales in the mid-1990s corresponds to the introduction of higher-priced instant lottery games. Finally, although other state taxes such as sales taxes and excise taxes are also regressive, the tax incidence of state lotteries has received much more critical attention given the revenue maximization objective of state lottery agencies and the moral opposition of some groups toward state-sponsored gambling. As more states continue to adopt lotteries and other states expand lottery operations, the tax incidence of state lotteries will likely remain at the forefront of the policy debate over state lottery adoption and expansion. 6 Ticket sales data are from Lafluer's (2009) . the data and empirical methodology. The fourth section contains the empirical results, which confirm the hypothesis that the tax incidences for instant lottery games vary dramatically by price point. The final section of the paper is reserved for discussion and concluding remarks.
II. An Overview of Instant Games by Price Point
In the mid-1990s states began to offer higher-priced instant lottery tickets in addition to the traditional $1 instant lottery game. The most common price points for these higher-priced The sales of higher-priced instant tickets relative to $1 instant tickets are attributed to the higher jackpots and greater expected return available from these higher-priced games.
In comparison, revenues from the traditional $1 instant lottery game accounted for only 11 percent ($3.1 billion) of total instant-lottery ticket revenue. A search of state lottery websites reveals that $1 instant lottery games have top jackpots averaging from $50,000 to $100,000, whereas higher-priced instant games have jackpots of several million dollars. At the time of this writing, for example, the Florida Lottery offers a $20 instant game with a jackpot of $3 million; the Texas Lottery offers a $50 instant game with a top prize of $7.5 million; and the New York Lottery offers a $30 instant game with a jackpot of $1 million a year for life.
9 Higher-priced instant lottery games also tend to have a greater expected return to the player (corresponding to a lower return to the state). On average, $1 instant lottery games have an expected return to the player of about 50 to 55 percent, whereas higher-priced instant games have a return of about 60 to 70 percent. Although state lottery agencies receive a lower percentage return from each higher-priced instant game on average, the absolute dollar amount the lottery agency receives from each higher-priced instant game is greater than that from each $1 game.
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The primary objective of state lottery agencies is to generate profits from the sale of lottery tickets to fund various public social programs.
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First consider a monopoly state lottery that sells only instant tickets at a single price point, say $1. The lottery has revenue of P 1 (Q 1 )·Q 1 and costs of C(Q 1 ), where P 1 = the price point of the lottery ticket and Q 1 = the quantity of tickets sold.
As such, the introduction and current availability of higher-priced instant games appears commensurate with this objective as state lottery agencies are generating greater revenues from higher-priced instant lottery tickets. It is straightforward to demonstrate that lottery profits are higher when the state lottery offers instant lottery tickets with different price-points. The lottery will maximize
. Differentiating profits with respect to Q and rearranging terms yields which is the usual profit-maximizing condition for a monopolist. With positive MC and P 1 , it must be the case that the price elasticity of demand, ε, is less than -1.
Thus, the demand for $1 tickets is price elastic at the profit maximizing level of P 1 and Q 1 .
Because the demand for $1 instant tickets is price elastic at the profit-maximizing price and level of output, a profit-maximizing state lottery cannot generate additional revenue by increasing the price of $1 instant tickets. Profits may be increased through more advertising (to increase Q), but this would be only a short-run solution since sales eventually plateau over time as games age (Mikesell, 1994) . To generate greater profits over the longer-run, the state lottery can segment the market for lottery tickets based on consumer income -high (low) income consumers are more (less) likely to buy higher-priced tickets -by introducing higher-priced instant lottery tickets in addition to still offering $1 tickets. If the state lottery now offers N higher-priced instant lottery games in addition to $1 instant games, the lottery will maximize profits (Π) of Clearly, Π > π if the revenue from each game exceeds the cost of providing each game. This condition makes intuitive sense, as it is unlikely that state lotteries would, at least in the long run, operate an individual lottery game at a loss.
13 13 In the short run it is possible for revenue from any game n to be less than the costs of producing game n (i.e., in the short run an instant lottery game may still be produced as long as price exceeds average variable costs). Losses on any game could be a result of substitution between games (Clotfelter and Cook, 1989) or a mistaken estimation of consumer demand by the state lottery agency.
Lottery profits will therefore be greater if the lottery offers multiple instant games at various price points than if it offered only $1 instant games.
In order to generate sales from higher-priced instant games, higher-priced instant tickets must have higher jackpots since there would be no incentive for players to buy higher-priced tickets if these tickets have the same jackpot size as $1 tickets. Not only are higher-priced tickets simply more affordable to higher-income players, research by Caplin and Leahy (1998) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggests that higher-income individuals are more likely to play lottery games with larger jackpots, such as those offered by higher-priced instant games. Thus, the greater affordability of higher-priced tickets by higher-income individuals and the preference of these individuals for larger jackpots suggest that higher-priced instant tickets may be less regressive than lower-priced instant tickets.
III. Data and Methodology
To determine the tax incidence of state lotteries, the majority of research on the subject has estimated the income elasticity of demand for lottery tickets by regressing lottery sales on income and a set of economic and demographic characteristics. 14 A lottery is regressive if the estimated income elasticity is less than one. The unit of observation has typically been a zip code, a county, or a state.
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14 Although parametric estimation has been used most commonly to determine lottery tax incidence, several studies have used the Suits Index, which measures the relative sizes of cumulative tax burdens and cumulative incomes (see Clotfelter and Cook, 1989; Price and Novak, 1999; Combs, Kim, and Spry, 2008; and Ghent and Grant, 2010) .
As a result, any income elasticity estimated from aggregate data cannot be interpreted the same as an individual's income elasticity of demand unless all agents are homogeneous. Therefore, our estimated income elasticities of demand here (as in previous studies using aggregated data) should be interpreted as a measure of the responsive of regional per capita sales with respect to changes in regional per capita income.
15 Zip codes and counties have been the unit of observation used in most studies of lottery tax incidence, but studies by Clotfelter and Cook (1987) , Scott and Garen (1994) , and Kearney (2005) used household survey data.
The few studies of the tax incidence of instant games (in aggregate) have generally found income elasticities less than one, although estimates vary across studies. In an analysis of Illinois counties for several years in the 1980s, Mikesell (1989) finds an income elasticity of demand for instant tickets of about 0.95. Garrett and Coughlin (2009) use county-level data for several states and obtain income elasticity estimates for instant games that range from 0.20 to 0.70. Other studies obtain much smaller income elasticity estimates. For example, Novak (1999, 2000) find income elasticities of -0.20 to -0.45 for instant lottery tickets in Texas, thus suggesting instant tickets are inferior goods. A similar result was found by Hansen (1995) in a county-level analysis of Colorado instant lottery games. Despite the wide range of estimates across studies, each study has found that instant lottery games are regressive. These studies, however, used aggregate instant-lottery ticket sales in their analysis, thus ignoring potential differences in the tax incidence of instant lottery tickets with different price points.
To test the hypothesis that the regressivity of higher-priced instant games is less than that of lower-priced instant games, the analysis here uses county-level data for the states of Florida, Descriptive statistics for instant-lottery price point sales are shown in Table 1 . As seen in this table, sales of $1 instant tickets accounted for only 7 percent to 24 percent of total instant sales (depending on the state) in 2009, whereas sales of $2, $3, $5, and $10 tickets each contributed a larger share of total instant-game sales. Not surprisingly, per capita sales for these price points were generally higher than sales for $1 instant games.
[ Table 1 ]
The correlation analysis in Table 2 provides preliminary insight into the relationship between per capita instant lottery sales by price point and per capita county income. The correlation between county income and $1 instant ticket sales is shown in column (1), and the correlation between county income and sales for the highest-priced instant game in the state is shown in column (2). As seen in Table 2 , the correlation between per capita income and per capita sales differs significantly by instant-game price point. For each of the six states, the correlation between income and $1 ticket sales is less than the correlation between income and higher-priced instant ticket sales. In many instances, the correlation between $1 ticket sales and income is negative, whereas the correlation between higher-priced sales and income is positive.
The difference between these correlations is statistically significant for all states except Missouri and West Virginia (column 3). In sum, the correlations shown in Table 2 generally reveal a larger positive (or less negative) correlation between higher-priced instant ticket sales and income.
[ Table 2 ]
Since the primary objective here is to explore the tax incidences of different instant lottery games, it is necessary to estimate income elasticities of lottery demand. To do so, the following lottery demand equation is estimated for each instant lottery game in each state: (1) is less (greater) than one. The lottery tax is considered proportional if the income elasticity is equal to one.
The matrix Z contains demographic variables that previous studies have identified as significant determinants of lottery sales. Specifically, the instant-lottery demand model includes population density, the percentage of the population with a bachelor's degree or higher, the percentage of the population 65 years of age or older, and a binary indicator variable for whether the county borders another state. 18 Past research has shown that lottery sales are (1) higher in more densely populated areas, (2) inversely related to education levels, and (3) different across age groups.
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Equation (1) is estimated for each instant-ticket price point in each state (see Table 1 ) to obtain game-specific income elasticities of demand. In addition, equation (1) is estimated using pooled data for the six states. The income elasticity of demand for all instant games (the sum of game-specific sales) in each state is also obtained to highlight differences in the game-specific income elasticities and the overall instant-game income elasticity. To support the conceptual hypothesis, it should be the case that game-specific income elasticities are different than the overall instant-game elasticity, or, more specifically, higher-priced instant games should have
The effect of cross-border lottery shopping has been shown to influence lottery sales in border counties (Garrett and Marsh, 2002; Tosun and Skidmore, 2004) .
18 All data were obtained from the U.S. Census. 19 Studies have considered other economic and demographic variables as well, including the unemployment rate and the percent of the population living below the poverty level. A confounding issue in modeling lottery demand is that many of these variables tend to be highly correlated with each other as well as income and education. We include only income and education since these two variables have tended to be the strongest predictors of lottery sales in the literature.
larger income elasticities than lower-priced instant games (i.e., higher-priced games are less regressive).
IV. Empirical Results
The income elasticity of demand for each instant-game price point in each state is shown in Table 3 . For brevity, the coefficient estimates for all other independent variables are not shown.
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[ Table 3 ]
The empirical results in Table 3 support the hypothesis that higher-priced instant games have larger income elasticities than lower-priced instant games and thus are less regressive than lower-priced games. For each state, the estimated income elasticity of demand increases in magnitude with the instant game price point, although all income elasticity estimates are not significantly different than zero for the states of Iowa and Missouri (but still indicate regressivity since β < 1). For the other states, the income elasticities for higher-priced instant games are statistically larger than the income elasticity estimates for the lower-priced instant games. The same results are found for the pooled estimation.
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[ Figure 1 ] Thus, although it is not possible to test the equality of income elasticity estimates across instant games (since they are each from a different regression), there is evidence that higher-priced instant games are less regressive than lowerpriced games since the former are statistically greater than zero and have larger income elasticity estimates. The estimated income elasticities from Table 3 are shown in Figure 1 to illustrate that the regressivity of instant lottery tickets decreases as the ticket price point increases. 20 Complete regression results will gladly be provided upon request. 21 The pooled regression includes state dummy variables.
One interesting finding is that the income elasticities of demand for instant tickets that cost $10 or more in New York, Texas, and West Virginia are considerably larger (estimates range from 0.84 to 1.12) than the income elasticities for all other instant games. For these games, t-tests indicate that the null hypothesis that each income elasticity is equal to one cannot be rejected. Thus, the lottery tax is proportional for these higher-priced instant games (shown in italics in Table 3 ). Although the lottery tax for online games has been shown to be proportional or progressive in some instances (Mikesell, 1989; Oster, 2004; Garrett and Coughlin, 2009 ), the results presented here are the first to reveal that higher-priced instant games may, to some degree, mimic online games in terms of their income elasticity of demand. This seems reasonable, as higher-priced instant games have jackpots and odds of winning that are more similar to online games than are the jackpots and odds of winning in lower-priced instant games.
The important conclusion is that not all instant lottery games may be a regressive form of taxation.
The results shown in the last column of Table 3 and the far-right bar in each graph in Figure 1 reveal that the income elasticities for all instant games combined (which are similar to those found in previous studies) are quite different than the income elasticities from individual instant games. For example, the income elasticity for all instant games in New York is 0.53, but individual instant-game elasticities range from not significantly different than zero up to 1.12. A similar result is found for Florida, Texas, West Virginia, and the pooled sample of states. Thus, while regressivity is found for most instant games and for all instant games combined, the degree of regressivity varies dramatically across instant games, and in some cases, the income elasticity for aggregated instant games masks the proportional tax incidence of some higher-priced instant games.
The analysis thus far has focused on comparing the income elasticities of demand for each instant game price-point (and aggregate instant ticket sales). It is worthwhile to now briefly explore how the income elasticities of demand for higher-priced instant games compare with the income elasticity of demand for online games (in aggregate). Since online lottery games have much higher jackpots than the highest-priced instant lottery games, it is expected that the income elasticity of demand for online tickets is greater than that for instant games.
Equation (1) was re-estimated for each state and the pooled sample of states using per capita online lottery sales as the dependent variable. The estimated income elasticities for online games are shown in the last column of Table 4 . To provide a comparison with the instant game elasticities, the largest instant price point income elasticity and the aggregate instant game elasticity (both from Table 3 ) are shown in the first two columns of Table 4 .
[ Table 4 ]
The results in Table 4 show that the income elasticity for online games is generally higher than that of each instant game price point, but there are some exceptions. For example, in
Florida the income elasticity of demand for $30 instant tickets is greater than that for online games. In Texas, aggregate instant games as well as $5, $10, and $20 games have income elasticities greater than that for online games. Finally, $10, $20, and $30 instant games in the pooled sample of states have income elasticities greater than that for online lottery games.
Generally, the results show that online games are less regressive than instant lottery games, a finding supported by earlier literature. But the analysis by instant game price point done here suggests the possibility that some higher-priced instant games may be less regressive than online games.
V. Conclusion
The tax incidence of state lotteries has been, and most likely will continue to be, the most important issue in the policy discussion of state lottery adoption and expansion. To date, studies on the tax incidence of lotteries have examined the tax incidence of the two broad categories of lottery games -instant games and online games. Research has generally found that instant lottery games are more regressive than online games, with the common explanation that higherincome players are more attracted to online games' higher jackpots. Following similar logic, it was argued here that the tax incidence of individual instant lottery games should differ for a similar reason -namely, higher-income players are more likely to play higher-priced instant lottery games with larger jackpots. Thus, the regressivity of higher-priced instant games should be less than that of lower-priced instant games.
This article estimated the income elasticity of demand for individual instant lottery games using county-level data for six states. The results reveal that the income elasticities of demand for higher-priced instant tickets are generally greater than those of lower-priced instant games, thus supporting the hypothesis that higher-priced tickets are less regressive than lower-priced tickets. Most higher-priced instant tickets, despite being less regressive than lower-priced instant tickets, are more regressive than online games (but less so than lower-priced instant tickets).
Evidence was also provided that the tax incidence for several higher-priced instant games was not significantly different than proportionality. This finding suggests that not all instant lottery games may be a regressive form of taxation.
The income elasticity estimates for each instant game price point were also found to be quite different than the income elasticity of aggregated instant sales. For example, the income elasticity for all instant games in New York is 0.53, but individual instant-game elasticities range from not significantly different than zero up to 1.12. Similarly, in the pooled sample of states, the income elasticity for all instant games was 0.29, but individual instant-game elasticities ranged from zero to 0.73. The large difference between aggregate instant-game elasticities and those for individual games further reveals that using aggregated instant-game sales may mask large differences in the tax incidence of individual instant games.
The difference in the income elasticity estimates for each instant-game price point also sheds light on the growth of sales with respect to county income. The growth in higher-priced instant-game sales should be greater than that for lower-priced games as the former have higherincome elasticities. This suggests that state lottery agencies may generate greater revenues by offering more lottery games with higher income elasticities of demand. On the other hand, decreases in income may adversely affect revenue from higher-priced games more than lowerpriced games, which have a smaller income elasticity of demand.
Although one can take the view that regressivity is bad regardless of the degree of regressivity, it can be argued that there is a significant difference in the policy discussion regarding a lottery game with an income elasticity of, say, 0.10 versus another game with an income elasticity of 0.80. Certainly the weight of the regressivity argument is dependent on the degree of regressivity rather than absolute regressivity. Any policy discussion on the tax incidence of instant lotteries games therefore benefits from a game-level analysis of tax incidence rather than a more aggregate analysis since the latter, as shown here, can mask large differences in instant-game tax incidence. Notes: * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent or better from testing H o : ρ i = 0. 'Top Sales' is sales for the highestpriced instant lottery game in the state (see Table 1 ). 
